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What Difference Does it Make?:  
Facilitative Judicial Mediation of Discrimination Cases in Employment Tribunals 
 
 
Andrew Boon*, Peter Urwin** and Valeriya Karuk*** 
 
 
„… the major thing is the impartial ear, you know what I mean, somebody that has nothing to do 
with the case, hasn‟t been involved, fresh eyes looking on the case, as it were, because the 
people that I worked for were so adamant that what I was saying was lies.‟ (Participant 4) 
 
 
Abstract: Mediation is promoted by government to reduce the volume, cost and formality of 
dispute resolution, but evidence of these benefits is inconclusive. A number of reports have 
analysed mediation of contract and similar cases in the County Courts but there has been little 
empirical work in the employment field. This article considers the findings of an evaluation of 
(facilitative) judicial mediation, piloted by the Employment Tribunal Service, for 
discrimination cases starting between June 2006 and March 2007. A matched analysis of the 
outcomes from one hundred and sixteen mediated cases, relative to an unmediated control 
group, found no significant impact of early resolution attributable to judicial mediation. This 
article digs deeper into the additional qualitative and quantitative evidence generated by the 
study to shed light on the process and outcomes. Detailed mediation reports completed by the 
judicial mediators and „in-depth‟ interviews are reviewed to describe the outcomes of 
mediation employment cases against the outcomes offered in law, the views and levels of 
satisfaction of claimants, respondents and representative are considered. Suggestions are 
made for either adjusting the facilitative mediation model or seeking an alternative that 
complements existing dispute resolution services, particularly those provided by ACAS. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The steady escalation of the work of employment tribunals 1  has stimulated efforts to 
discourage weak claims, promote settlement and accelerate the flow of cases. Various reports 
advocate Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and particularly mediation,2  but, despite 
being widely available in the UK for at least a decade, it has not achieved the presence 
envisaged by Lord Woolf's review of civil procedure in 1996.3  Nevertheless, in government 
policy, mediation remains a key strategy for ensuring „… that different types of dispute can 
be resolved fairly, quickly, efficiently and effectively, without recourse to the expense and 
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1
 Created by the Industrial Training Act 1964 as „Industrial Tribunals‟ the name was changed from 1 August 1998 
by the Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998. 
2
 See e.g. Michael Gibbons, Better Dispute Resolution: A Review of Employment Dispute Resolution in Great 
Britain (London: Department of Trade and Industry 2007) 9, the White Paper Transforming Public Services: 
Complaints, Redress and Tribunals (Cm 6243, 2004) and Delivering justice, rights and democracy. DCA Strategy 
2004 – 2009, Brendan Malkin, „LCD Pledges to Cut Costs as Govt. Pushes Mediation Plan‟ (2004) The Lawyer 
(15 March) 4.  
3
 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice (Final Report) (London: HMSO 1996) 4-12. 
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formality of courts and tribunals where this is not necessary‟.4 The literature highlights a 
range of practical and policy issues, including the effectiveness of mediation,5 the appeal to 
litigants,6 the denial of formal justice to powerless groups7 the risk of annexation to court 
processes and the ethics of mandatory participation8 and regulation of the field.9 Mediation is 
no panacea for the ills of dispute resolution. There are a wide range of approaches available 
and what works well in one situation may work less well in another.10 Each context presents 
new challenges.   
The research reported here, to evaluate a judicial mediation service piloted by the 
Employment Tribunal Service (ETS), 11  was commissioned by the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (now Ministry of Justice) in 2006. Policy aims of the pilot included 
reducing the volume of cases for hearing and promoting better industrial relations. It was 
hoped that litigants would achieve cost-effective and beneficial outcomes, more quickly, with 
less need for advice, assistance and representation. The quantitative analysis of the pilot data 
did not establish the effectiveness or efficiency of mediation but, despite the scepticism of 
interest groups, 12  the pilot was regarded as successful. 13  Judicial mediation was made 
available for discrimination cases at Employment Tribunal regional offices in England and 
Wales from January 2009.14 This article examines qualitative data generated by the fieldwork 
for the less tangible benefits often claimed for mediation 15  and suggests how judicial 
mediation in discrimination cases might be more effective. 
As Table 1 shows, discrimination, and connected jurisdictions like equal pay, are 
increasing more rapidly than conventional areas16 contributing to the volume of cases,17 to 
                                            
4
 Transforming Public Services (n 2) 6, para.2.3. 
5
 John Peysner and Mary Seneviratne, The Management of Civil Cases: the Courts and the post-Woolf Landscape 
(London: DCA 2005), Lisa Webley, Pamela Abrams and Sylvie Bacquet, Evaluation of the Birmingham Court-
Based Civil (Non-Family) Mediation Scheme (London: DCA 2006), Sue Prince and Sophie Belcher, An Evaluation 
of the Effectiveness of Court-based Mediation Processes in Non-Family Civil proceedings at Exeter and Guildford 
County Courts (London: DCA 2006), Sue Prince and Sophie Belcher, An Evaluation of the Small Claims Dispute 
Resolution Pilot at Exeter County Court (London: DCA 2006). 
6
 Hazel Genn, „Solving Civil Justice Problems: What Might be Best?‟ (paper for Scottish Consumer Council on 
Civil Justice 19 January 2005), Michael Lind, „ADR and Mediation-Boom or Bust‟ (2001) 151 NLJ 1238, 17 
August 2001.  
7
 Richard Abel, „The Contradictions of Informal Justice‟ in Richard Abel (ed.), The Politics of Informal Justice: 
The American Experience (New York: Academic Press 1982) 
8
 Deborah Hensler, „What We Know and Don‟t Know About Court Administered Arbitration‟ (1986) 69 Judic. 
270, William Edwards, „No Frills Justice: North Carolina Experiments with Court Ordered Arbitration‟ (1988) 66 
NCL Rev. 395 and Andrew Pirie, „The Lawyer as a Third Party Neutral: Promise and Problems‟ in D. Paul 
Edmonds (ed.), Commercial Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Litigation (Aurora: Canada Law Books Inc 1989) 
27 at 35. 
9
 Andrew Boon, Richard Earle and Avis Whyte, 'Regulating Mediators?' (2007) 10:1 Legal Ethics 26. 
10
 Cheryl Dolder, „The Contribution of Mediation to Workplace Justice‟ (2004) 33:4 ILJ 320, Robert Emery, 
David Sbarra and Tara Grover, „Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections‟ (2005) 43:1 FCR 22. 
11
 In March 2006 the ETS joined existing tribunals in the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) to form a 
new Tribunals Service Agency. This unification was proposed initially by Sir Andrew Leggatt in his report 
Tribunals for Users-One system, One Service (August 2001) <http://www.tribunals-review.org.uk/> accessed 7 
April 2010.  
12
 <http://www.human-law.co.uk/Blog/2009/07/Why-Judicial-Mediation-is-a-Letdown-in-Employment-Disputes/> 
accessed 26 April 2010.  
13
 Tribunals Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2008-9 (London: The Stationery Office 2009). 
14
 In Scotland, work began to develop a similar scheme. 
15
 Peter Urwin, Valeriya Karuk, Paul Latreille, Elisabeth Michielsens, Lionel Page, Bernadetta Siara and Stefan 
Speckesser with Andrew Boon and Paul-Antoine Chevalier, Evaluating the use of judicial mediation in 
Employment Tribunals (Ministry of Justice Research Series 7/10, March 2010). 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/judicial-mediation-research.htm> accessed 26 April 2010. 
16
 Thousands of cases are rejected with around half accepted after re-submission.   
17
 See for example, William Brown, Simon Deakin, David Nash, and Sarah Oxenbridge, „The Employment 
Contract: From Collective Procedures to Individual Rights‟ (2000) 38:4 BJIR 611, Stephen Drinkwater and Peter 
Ingram, „Have Industrial Relations in the U.K. Really Improved?‟ (2005) 19:2 Lab Rev Lab Econ Ind Relat 373.  
Contrast Geraldine Healy, Harriet Bradley and Nupur Mukherjee, „Individualism and Collectivism Revisited: A 
Study of Black and Minority Ethnic Women‟ (2004) 35:5 Ind Relat J 451, Len L. Shackleton Employment 
Tribunals-Their growth and the Case for Radical Reform (London: Institute of Employment Affairs 2002).   
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complexity,18 and to increases in average length of hearing. The pilot focused on these issues, 
so that, amongst the eligible discrimination cases, only those with single claimants and an 
expected hearing length of three or more days were prioritised for mediation.   
 
Table 1: Claims Accepted by Employment Tribunals and the mix of jurisdictions disclosed in 
claims 
 
 Apr 07 to Mar 08 
 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 
Total Claims Accepted 115,039 132,577 189,303 
Jurisdiction Mix of Claims Accepted 
Nature of Claim 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 
    
Sex Discrimination 14,250 28,153 26,907 
Suffer a detriment/unfair dismissal – pregnancy 1,504 1,465 1,646 
Disability Discrimination 4,585 5,533 5,833 
Equal Pay 17,268 44,013 62,706 
Race Discrimination 4,103 3,780 4,130 
Discrimination on Grounds of Religion or Belief 486 648 709 
Discrimination on grounds of Sexual Orientation 395 470 582 
Age Discrimination n/a 972 2,949 
Sub-Total 42,591 85,034 105,462 
    
Working Time Directive 35,474 21,127 55,712 
Redundancy Pay 7,214 7,692 7,313 
Redundancy – failure to inform and consult 4,056 4,802 4,480 
Unfair dismissal 41,832 44,491 40,941 
Unauthorised deductions (Formerly Wages Act) 32,330 34,857 34,583 
Breach of Contract 26,230 27,298 25,054 
Written Statement of Terms and Conditions 3,078 3,429 4,955 
Written Statement of Reasons for Dismissal 955 1,064 1,098 
Written Pay Statement 794 990 1,086 
Transfer of an undertaking – failure to inform and consult 899 1,108 1,380 
Part Time Workers Regulations 402 776 595 
National Minimum Wage 440 806 431 
Others 5,219 5,072 13,873 
Overall Total 201,514 238,546 296,963 
 
Taken from Employment Tribunal and EAT Statistics (GB) 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008.19 
 
 
Methodology 
 
All sex, race, disability, religion and sexual orientation discrimination claimants at tribunals 
in London, Birmingham and Newcastle presenting between June 2006 and March 2007, were 
asked if they were interested „in principle‟ in judicial mediation. Of the one hundred and 
ninety six cases where both parties agreed in principle to the offer of judicial mediation, the 
pilot sought mediation for at least half; producing treatment and control groups. Over the ten 
months of the pilot period, one hundred and sixteen of the one hundred and ninety six willing 
parties entered mediation within seven weeks of the date that the offer was made. 
Simultaneously, eighty cases in the parallel „control‟ group continued with the usual process 
of case development, including conciliation. With an estimated eight hundred and sixty eight 
cases satisfying the eligibility criteria for inclusion the take up rate (196) was just under one 
quarter (23%) of the available sample. 
                                            
18
 Mainly because of the range of jurisdictions arising in single claims. Claims involved 1.8 jurisdictions per 
application on average in 2004-5 (Paul Latreille, Julie Latreille and Ben Knight, Employment Tribunals and Acas: 
evidence from a survey of representative Working Paper 2006). 
19<http://www.employmenttribunals.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/EmploymentTribunal_and_EAT_Statistics_v
9.pdf > accessed 23 November 2010. 
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Table 2: Mediated and unmediated cases within the pilot regions  
 
 Cases 
experiencing 
judicial 
mediation 
Cases expressing 
an interest in 
principle, but not 
mediated  
Cases where offer of 
mediation rejected in 
principle 
Region    
Newcastle 41   (35.3%) 30   (37.5%) 114   (24.2%) 
London central 48   (41.4%) 28     (35%) 171   (36.2%) 
Birmingham 27   (23.3%) 22   (27.5%) 187   (39.6%) 
All Pilot Regions 116   (100%) 80   (100%) 472   (100%) 
 
Source: Employment Tribunals Service case management data (ETHOS) & transferred hard copy administrative 
data.  
 
Analysis of administrative paperwork and ETHOS case management data showed 
that thirteen of the judicially mediated cases ultimately went to hearing, eleven per cent of all 
judicially mediated cases, whereas twenty four per cent of the cases expressing an interest, 
but were not mediated, eventually went to a hearing. Thus, of the one hundred and sixteen 
cases that experienced judicial mediation, fifty seven per cent arrived at some form of 
resolution that avoided a hearing, compared to sixty one per cent amongst cases that 
expressed an interest, but were not mediated and fifty four per cent of cases that rejected the 
offer in principle. The allocation of one hundred and ninety six „interested in principle‟ cases 
to the mediated (116) or unmediated (80) group was not random, and therefore Propensity 
Score Matching (PS Match) was used to tackle the possibility that treatment and control 
groups exhibit systematic differences in characteristics.20 Taking this into account, however, 
the analysis found no discernable or statistically significant impact of early resolution 
attributable to judicial mediation.  
This article is not, however, primarily concerned with these data, but with qualitative 
data generated by the fieldwork. These data include a satisfaction survey of those expressing 
interest in judicial mediation, which was conducted by telephone during October and 
November 2007, with thirty five claimants and fifty one employers who had experienced 
judicial mediation, and forty five claimants and thirty seven employers who had not.21 The 
most significant qualitative data comprised ninety eight mediation reports completed by 
judicial mediators. These reports set out common details, such as duration and representation, 
and an account of the process of mediation by stage, together with the timings of each stage 
and a brief description of what occurred, for example, what offer or counter offer was made. 
In most cases this schedule was followed by general comments, usually the mediator's 
analysis and evaluation of the mediation. There were also eight in-depth interviews with 
participants selected from the satisfaction survey; four claimants and three respondents with a 
mixed experience of success in mediation and an „in-house‟ legal representative who had 
appeared in three employment mediations, one unsuccessful and two successful. The 
interviews lasted up to an hour and were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  
 
 
                                            
20
 It is easiest to envisage the process of matching as attempting to ensure that, for each mediated case, there is an 
otherwise identical or „matching‟ case in the unmediated group. In practice this involves a „reweighting‟ of the 
unmediated sample to look like the mediated sample. To achieve this, a range of characteristics are used as 
explanatory variables in a Probit regression which models whether we observe the case in the mediated or 
unmediated sample. This allows estimation of a „score‟ reflecting the „propensity‟ for a particular case to be 
observed in the mediated group – hence „propensity score‟. 
Once a propensity score has been estimated for each case in the mediated and unmediated samples, they can be 
matched accordingly. Thus, we ensure that each mediated case with a propensity of z%, is matched with an 
unmediated case that has a similar propensity of z% to be observed amongst the mediated group. 
21
 47 of these had undergone judicial mediation and 27 of them had not, representing 45% employers and 49% 
claimants. 
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The Context  
 
a) Process  
 
Employment Tribunals hear claims made by individual employees [claimants] submitting an 
„ET1‟ form setting out details of their case. An employer or former employer [the respondent] 
has twenty eight days to respond by an ET3 form. The case is then reviewed by an 
employment judge who issues written directions or holds a case management discussion 
(CMD), to guide the case to hearing. Unsettled cases are heard by a panel, comprising an 
employer and trade union representative, chaired by a lawyer. Since the mid 1970s the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Advisory Service (ACAS) has had a statutory duty to provide 
conciliation in tribunal cases within a timescale that does not apply in discrimination cases.22 
In all pilot cases the parties were offered conciliation by ACAS.  If the parties expressed 
interest in judicial mediation, a two week mandatory period was allowed for further ACAS 
conciliation before the case was formally allocated to judicial mediation. After the point of 
allocation ACAS conciliation was suspended until judicial mediation had taken place, at 
which point it could resume. For this pilot, mediation chairs were volunteer tribunal chairs 
trained by representatives of ACAS in July 2006. 
Introducing judicial mediation to the employment tribunals involves choices about 
timing, referral mode, and process, all key factors in improving mediation outcomes.23 Broad 
consensus supports early intervention24 and referral was therefore offered at the CMD. The 
actual mediation followed a four stage format typical in court based processes25; identification 
of the issues at stake, generating and evaluating options, deciding on one or more alternatives 
and developing a plan for implementation.  At a joint meeting of the parties the mediator 
explains the process of mediation and either meets each separately or allows each side an 
opportunity to set out their perspective without interruption. The parties then usually negotiate 
and meet in turn with the mediator, who seeks common ground between the parties.26   
In the context of judicial mediation the most relevant theoretical models are 
facilitative mediation and evaluative mediation. Facilitative mediation focuses on 
encouraging the parties' communication and understanding. Like more recent transformative 
models, it seeks empowerment of individuals through the mediation process and therefore 
does not impose, or even suggest, solutions. In evaluative mediation, an expert more actively 
assists the parties anticipate the outcome of their dispute through litigation as part of the 
mediation process. Issues of control and participation in mediation models and practice are 
often contested, even controversial.27 Judges in court-annexed mediation may be criticised for 
bullying parties towards settlement and for intervening in the style of an arbitrator, thus 
robbing mediation of its vital, consensual ambience. In the pilot, participating judges were 
trained in facilitative mediation. Parties were told that a trained Tribunal Chairman would „(...) 
                                            
22
 This was during the period of the ACAS statutory duty to conciliate established by the Employment Tribunals 
Act 1996 (under regulations in force at the time, a fixed period of seven or thirteen weeks). The Gibbons review 
having concluded that fixed conciliation periods had not promoted more or earlier resolution of disputes, the duty 
to conciliate was abolished by the Employment Act 2009 and is now discretionary. 
23
 Kathy Mack, Court Referral to ADR: Criteria and Research (National ADR Advisory Council & Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration 2003), Jean Hiltrop, „Factors Associated with Successful Labor Mediation‟ in 
Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt (eds.), Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party 
Intervention (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers 1989) 215. 
24
 Roselle Wissler, „Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical 
Research‟ (2001-2) 17 JDR 641, 677, Jayne Zuberbuhler, „Early Intervention Mediation: The Use of Court-
Ordered Mediation in the Initial Stages of Divorce Litigation to Resolve Parenting Issues‟ (2001) 39:2 FCR 203.   
25
 Richard Ingleby, In the Ball Park: Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts (Melbourne: Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration 1991) 13. 
26
 Hazel Genn, Mediation in Action: Resolving Court Disputes Without Trial (London: Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation 1999, 24) 
27
 Robert Dingwall and David Greatbatch, „Who is in Charge? Rhetoric and Evidence in the Study of Mediation‟ 
(1993) 15 JSWFL 367, Marian Roberts, „Who is in Charge? Effecting a Productive Exchange Between 
Researchers and Practitioners in the Field of Family Mediation‟ (1994) 16 JSWFL 439. 
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remain neutral and try to assist the parties in resolving their dispute‟, would „not make a 
decision about the case, or give an opinion on the merits of the case‟.28  
Riskin suggests that most mediation takes place on a continuum between the 
evaluative and facilitative model.29 Mediators may have a natural orientation to a place on the 
continuum, but deploy each model in different circumstances. Another continuum is the range 
of issues the parties may be open to exploring. These may be narrow, for example, a money 
outcome reflecting an anticipated court decision, but can broaden to encompass mutual 
business opportunities, personal or professional considerations or community interests. Both 
facilitative and evaluative models are adaptable to dealing with narrow or broad issues, but 
the type of dispute may favour one method over another. Discovery of mutual and broad 
interests may be assisted by the kind of open questioning associated with facilitative 
mediation, whereas an evaluative approach may suit a party's needs when the issues are 
narrow.   
Mediation in employment tribunals inevitably takes place in the shadow of the law, 
providing a potentially narrow frame. Anticipating the likely tribunal decision is a vital 
element of the parties' calculation, even if it not the decisive factor. The outcome of 
employment cases is often uncertain, and that in discrimination proceedings particularly so. 
First, there is a shifting burden of proof. The claimant must establish a prima facie case, 
whereupon the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to show that it did not discriminate 
against the claimant. Second, the finding of fact is usually based on circumstantial evidence 
that a colleagues‟ behaviour, involving covert or unintended behaviour, constitutes either 
direct or indirect discrimination. Third, unusually rigorous investigation and disclosure 
procedures might produce unexpected evidence. Claimants can seek disclosure of documents 
like internal memos or notes made by the employer or prospective employer during 
interviews and send a questionnaire to the employer asking specific questions about the 
incident. Employers‟ replies, or refusal to answer these questions, can be used in evidence.  
Since the facilitative model limits judges‟ opportunity to express an opinion on the 
likely success of the case, or its value, the adoption of the facilitative model deprives parties 
of guidance. This is problematic in Employment Tribunals, which were established with the 
intention of excluding lawyers and do not indemnify successful parties for the cost of legal 
advice. It is therefore necessary to consider whether the kinds of cases in the pilot, and the 
kinds of agreement reached in them, involve narrow or broad issues or simply involve 
questions of compensation. In the latter case, a more evaluative mediation framework may be 
desirable. Such a conclusion may be justified if, for example, the facilitative model did not 
deliver the consensus, understanding or empowerment that is its core rationale.       
 
b) The caseload  
 
Voluntary mediation often suffers from low take-up, perhaps especially in the UK30 compared 
with other common law jurisdictions.31  There are various reasons why discrimination cases 
may buck this trend; cost savings, speed and the possibility of a „better deal‟32 together with 
the fact that the dispute has a personal context, rather than a business one, and the parties 
                                            
28
 Text taken from the documentation provided to claimants, respondents and their representatives. 
29
 Leonard Riskin, 'Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed' 
(1996) 1:7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 7.  
30
 Hazel Genn, The Central London County Court Mediation Scheme: Evaluation Report (London: Department for 
Constitutional Affairs 1998) and Hazel Genn, Paul Fenn, Marc Mason Andrew Lane, Nadia Bechai, Lauren Gray, 
Dev Vencappa, Twisting Arms: Court Referred and Court Linked Mediation Under Judicial Pressure (London: 
Ministry of Justice 2007) Ch.4. 
31
 John Baldwin, „“Litigants” Experiences of Adjudication in County Courts‟ (1999)18 CJQ 12 notes a preference 
for civil adjudication in the UK (but see Marc Lampe and Seth Ellis, „Resolving Small Business Disputes Through 
Mediation‟(1995) JSBS 85, Jessica Pearson and Nancy Thoennes, „Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research 
Results‟ (1985) 19:4 Colum.J.L.& Soc.Probs. 451.  
32
 Carolyn Bordeaux, Rosemary O‟Leary and Richard Thornburgh, „Control, Communication, and Power: A study 
of the Use of the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution of Enforcement Actions at the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency‟ (2001) 17 Negotiation J. 175.  
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might foresee the relationship continuing. One reason why parties may favour mediation of 
discrimination claims is that claimants can claim compensation for discrimination while 
remaining employed at an organisation. Another is that, if formerly employed by the 
respondent, they may seek reemployment, like other claimants alleging unfair dismissal,. 
Finally, they may be seeking to return to work from a period of sick leave. This range of 
possible claimants was represented in the judicial mediation reports.  
The empirical evidence regarding impact of mediation on disposition and cost 
suggests that the type of case affects outcome. For example, mediation may have the most 
dramatic impact on appellate cases,33 but there is some evidence of small costs saving in small 
claims34 and family cases.35 Whilst quantitative data are not able to clearly establish whether 
discrimination cases as a class are particularly suitable for mediation, they often have 
dimensions that, in theory, can be addressed through mediation and some aspirations of the 
parties that might only be achieved by judgment. Various emotions, a desire for justice, 
vindication or revenge may play a part. Cases of sex, race and disability discrimination, 
especially those involving a past employment relationship, might therefore involve difficult 
circumstances and highly charged emotions. A number of the mediation reports commented 
on the impact of emotional state, particularly of claimants, on the mediation process. Eight of 
the mediation reports recorded that the claimant in the case did not want to see anyone, or a 
particular person, from the respondent organisation during the mediation process. In some, the 
mediator expressed concern for the frail emotional health of the claimant. One commented 
that depression or mental health issues appeared to be a factor in an increasing number of 
cases. In others, the mediator cast doubt on the motives of the respondent, suggesting that, 
from appearances, they were using the mediation to assess the claimant's evidence and 
specifically, the claimant.        
 
 
Settlement  
 
a) Agreements achieved by mediation  
 
Of the possible measures for the success of mediation, reduction of disposal time and cost, 
„fairness‟ of outcome, settlement of the case and satisfaction of the parties, matter to different 
degrees to distinct constituencies.36 Volume of disposals is important in itself because, while 
successful mediation can reduce costs, unsuccessful mediation usually increases costs. 37 
Improved settlement rates are usually the most pressing policy goal and, while relatively easy 
to establish, present problems in comparing locations and contexts.  The literature suggests a 
rate of agreement of between fifty and eighty five percent38 but this can be substantially 
lower.39 Settlement rates can also differ widely between mediated and unmediated groups.40 
Our quantitative methodology ensured that the comparator group was as close as possible to 
the mediation group and the comparison of settlement rate is therefore more meaningful.  
                                            
33
 Nancy Welsh, „Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice 
Theories‟ (2004) 54 J.Leg.Ed. 49. 
34
 Roselle Wissler, „Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case 
Characteristics‟ (1995) 29 Law & Soc'y Rev. 323 but see Neil Vidmar,  „An Assessment of Mediation in a Small 
Claims Court‟ (1985) 41 J Soc Issues 127. 
35
 Joan Kelly, „A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research‟ (1996) 34 FCCR 373. 
36
 Mack (n 23). 
37
 n. 30. 
38
 n 35, Mack (n 23), Julie Macfarlane, Court-Based Mediation for Civil Cases: An Evaluation of the Ontario 
Court (General Division) (ADR Centre, Windsor, Ontario: University of Windsor 2003). 
39
 Roselle Wissler, „The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases‟ (2004) 22:1/2 
Conflict Resol. Q. 55, points to settlement rates that range from as low as 13-22% 
40
 Robert Emery, Sheila G. Matthews and Melissa Wyer, „Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Further 
Evidence on the Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers‟ (1991) 59:3 J Consult Clin Psychol 1, suggest a 
difference of 72% and 11% for the mediated and unmediated groups in divorce cases. 
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The quantitative data reveals no significant differences in rates of settlement between 
the mediated and comparator group. Of the ninety eight mediation reports analysed here, 
agreement was achieved in fifty five cases by the end of the mediation; a settlement rate of 
fifty six per cent. However, the overall settlement rate of fifty seven across all mediated cases 
appears to compare unfavourably with the sixty one per cent achieved amongst the pilot 
sample of cases that did not undergo mediation (but in which the parties had expressed a 
willingness to consider mediation „in principle‟). As a result of the lack of a statistically 
significant difference between these rates of resolution, the analysis carried out as part of the 
original study suggests an overall direct risk-adjusted net cost to the ETS of £908 per judicial 
mediation case. Taking into account estimates of time saved amongst claimants and 
respondents drops this estimate of cost to £880 per case.41 This leads us to look more closely 
at the qualitative aspects of the study, to understand why cases undergoing judicial mediation 
may have failed to settle. 
 
b) Failure to settle 
 
The mediated sample contained ten cases, recorded as failed mediations, where there were 
strong indications that an agreement might be achieved within a short time. This was because 
the only remaining issue was compensation, and the differences between the parties were 
small, because of limitations on the authority of the respondents‟ representative to settle or 
because respondents needed to convince absent managers of the desirability of settlement. 
The inflexibility of timing for the pilot was a factor in a minority of mediations failing. Indeed, 
from the mediator‟s reports it was clear that mediation could not have succeeded at that 
particular point in the litigation. One example was where medical evidence was required to 
establish continuing incapacity or quantum of loss (MR9, MR28), another where the outcome 
of criminal and civil proceedings would have a bearing on the valuation of the case (MR38). 
Additionally, there were a small number of cases where it appeared that claimants were not 
psychologically strong enough to participate adequately.42 
A range of other factors may hinder settlement through mediation, including lack of 
party commitment to the process, 43  motivation to reach settlement, 44  parties‟ goals, 45  the 
amount at stake46 and the intensity of conflict.47 These categories overlap and it may be 
difficult to clearly compartmentalise the reason why settlement failed. Matters of principle are 
an exception, being typically less amenable to mediation and, usually, obvious.48 There were 
twenty seven cases in the mediated sample where the parties‟ differences were insuperable, 
there being no indication at all that settlement might occur after mediation. However, the 
impediment was rarely expressed as an issue of principle. In fact, there were only two clear 
examples of an issue of principle preventing settlement. In one a respondent refused to admit 
                                            
41
 It cost the ETS an estimated £136,437 to administer judicial mediation to 116 cases within the pilot period. Even 
in the absence of judicial mediation, it is expected that between 188 and 251 hearing days would be saved. Given 
this, the saving of 264 Hearing days under judicial mediation represents a value added of only 13 days, at most. If 
one then compares this cost saving to the cost of implementation, we arrive at an estimate of -£105,313 for 116 
cases. Taking into account the potential savings to employers and claimants only drops the estimate of net costs of 
delivering 116 cases from -£105,313 to -£102,025, or £880 per case. 
42
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43
 Jean Hiltrop, „Factors Associated with Successful Labor Mediation‟ in Kressel and Pruitt (n 23). 
44
 Joan Kelly and Lynn Gigy, „Divorce Mediation: Characteristics of Clients and Outcomes‟ and Saadia Touval 
and William Zartman „Mediation in International Conflicts‟ in Kressel and Pruitt (eds.) (n 23), Wissler (n 34), 
Nancy Burrell, Leonard Narus, Katherine Bogdanoff and Mike Allen, „Evaluating Parental Stressors of Divorcing 
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Just.Sys.J. 151, Wissler (n 34). 
46
 n 30. 
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 Frank Sander and Stephen Goldberg, „Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an 
ADR Procedure‟ (1994) 10 Negotiation J. 49. 
48
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that their treatment of the claimant was evidence of racism (MR10). Of the other the mediator 
said: 
 
The mediation was hampered in my view by the fact that the claimant was not being entirely open with his 
representative, let alone me, and his reason for refusing to accept the final offer was that it meant that 'no-
one was being held to account'. I was careful to explain that that was an unrealistic expectation of a 
mediation, but nevertheless the matter ended there. (JM23) 
 
In many cases the question of whether the claimant returned to work involved an issue 
of principle. An example was where a respondent refused to reinstate because of the impact 
on employees willing to give evidence against the claimant (MR41). As in this case, 
irreconcilability on the issue of return to work usually led to consideration of financial awards 
as an alternative. In two cases, however, one where the respondent would not offer a job and 
one where the claimant would not accept the job offered, mediation broke down.  
 
 
c) Quality of agreement 
Measures of mediation success that are difficult to prove quantitatively include degree of 
movement from initial positions, proportion of issues resolved, rates of compliance, „fairness‟ 
or „quality‟ of outcome and improvement in the post-mediation relationship or environment.49 
These measures are the ultimate justification for mediation50 and the facilitative model, which 
optimises outcomes by identifying the broadest range of issues. Mediators can encourage 
parties to consider more complex terms of settlement than would be ordered by courts.51 The 
mediators were apparently aware of the importance of exploring extra-legal possibilities, for 
example, as when one stated that „the agreement did include elements which could not have 
been included in any tribunal award‟ (JM 22). It may be difficult to find novel solutions in 
employment cases because of the relatively sophisticated range of interventions and remedies 
available to employment tribunals. Employees can remain in employment with the respondent 
employer and seek, through the tribunal, compensation and a change in policy or work 
practices, including assurances about future conduct. The first task of a tribunal considering 
remedies is to consider ordering reinstatement or re-engagement of employees.52   
Reinstatement means restoring a person to the same job they were in before dismissal, 
with no loss of pay, benefits and full continuity of rights. Re-engagement involves the 
claimant accepting a different job at comparable level. The tribunal can refuse to make either 
order if it is not 'reasonably practical' to do so. Where unfair dismissal is found and 
reinstatement not ordered, financial awards, considered below, can be made instead. In cases 
of discrimination or harassment, tribunals can make a declaration as to the rights of the parties 
or a recommendation as to remedial action by an employer. As part of such action the tribunal 
may appoint an official from ACAS to try and work out a settlement between the two parties. 
Some claimants continue to work for respondents while bringing discrimination claims, 
including while on sick leave. Only twenty three per cent of the original six hundred and sixty 
eight cases included in the pilot (see Table 2) involved claimants that were still employed in 
the job that was the focus of the ET1. Thirty one per cent of interested (mediated and 
unmediated) claimants and thirty four per cent of mediated cases reported that they were in 
the same job. By the time of any mediation event, one would expect, if anything, fewer 
individuals to be in the job that was the subject of the ET claim. 
Analysis of the mediation reports suggested that forty three of the ninety eight 
mediations recognised some possibility of a continuing relationship between the parties. In 
                                            
49
 See e.g. Thomas Kochan and Todd Jick, „The Public Sector Mediation Process: A Theory and Empirical 
Examination‟ (1978) J.Conflict Resol. 211, Kressel and Pruitt Mediation Research (n 23). 
50
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Arguments‟ (1989) 66:3 Denv.U.L.Rev. 335. 
51
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46 Stan.L.Rev. 1339. 
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 Employment Rights Act 1996, ss 114-115. 
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twenty two cases, one of the parties wanted to continue the employment relationship but the 
other side declined, albeit not always initially. Where claimants declined, they sometimes 
suggested that they no longer had confidence in the respondents or were not convinced that 
the situation they would return to had changed, for example, where their old line manager 
remained in post. When respondents declined it was usually because they could not agree to 
the terms the claimant sought to impose or the compensation also demanded. Judicial 
mediators occasionally observed that offers of reinstatement or re-engagement might be 
tactical. For example, the mediator in one case thought that the respondents would follow up 
their offer of the claimant's „dream job', which she declined, with a letter, thus establishing the 
claimant‟s failure to mitigate loss (MR53).  
In nineteen of the forty three cases where the possibility of continuing the relationship 
was raised, the mediation led to re-establishment or continuation of employment. In eight 
cases the mediation facilitated the reinstatement or re-engagement of the claimant, often from 
an unpromising starting point. In some cases the mediator directly attributed this to the 
structural opportunities offered by mediation. Examples were where the mediator recorded 
that the respondent was initially very unreceptive to the idea (MR7) or where the claimant‟s 
personal statement favourably impressed the respondent‟s representatives (MR40). In the 
remaining eleven cases the claimant was already in continuing employment but the mediation 
resulted in agreement about the future direction of the relationship or provided assurances 
about structures or opportunities, for example, for promotion. In these cases also, mediation 
may have provided a setting more conducive to resolution than negotiation.    
Where severance was involved the negotiation of the terms of the employer‟s 
reference was usually an issue. The other most likely point of discussion was a request for a 
written statement recognising that discrimination had taken place and an apology for such 
discrimination. Most claimants settled for a package including a letter of regret instead of a 
letter of apology. Confidentiality clauses were frequently requested by employers and were a 
term of most of the mediated agreements, but such a clause was central to only one. In that 
case the claimant accepted £11,000, retaining the right to speak to the press, rather than 
accept £12,500 with a confidentiality clause (MR73). In another, the respondent offered a 
good reference and help with the claimant‟s CV plus £6,500, but the claimant finally accepted 
£8,000 without either (MR81).  
Remedies unavailable to an employment tribunal were rare in the mediated agreements. 
The possible lack of scope for creative solutions was compensated for by the additional 
control the parties enjoyed over how, for example, reinstatement or reengagement was 
managed. Cases where employers had failed to make reasonable adjustments for disabled 
employees seem particularly suited to mediation with a view to continuing employment. 
Employers have an opportunity to consider adjustments, what other jobs employees might do 
and what positions may be available. In a few cases detailed negotiation made conventional 
solutions more appealing to the parties and more likely to succeed. In two cases the employer 
agreed to provide retraining to facilitate re-engagement. One employer agreed to undertake a 
risk assessment, create a training and development programme and schedule regular meetings 
with managers. Another employer agreed to a review of the department in which the claimant 
had worked. Yet another agreed to address action points on disability. The mediators' analyses 
suggest that these measures made claimants more comfortable about returning to the 
respondent organisations and that, in their absence, they may not have returned. Moreover, 
tribunals may have been disinclined to order re-engagement in these cases because of 
uncertainty that re-integration would be successful. 
There were a handful of examples of mediated solutions that a tribunal could not have 
ordered. One employer agreed to provide vouchers that could be redeemed at their store, 
another to recognise the achievements of a disabled employee, and yet another to an early 
retirement package that included the claimant keeping computing and other equipment. 
Probably the most creative solution the ninety eight mediations produced was that the 
claimant would be retained on a freelance basis and a number of specified freelance projects 
would be provided as part of the settlement. Although settlement agreements were usually left 
to ACAS representatives to finalise, it appeared that relatively few agreements would 
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necessitate complex terms. An exception was the settlement achieved in one case because the 
parties were able to reduce the significance of the financial gap between the parties' proposals 
by „structuring the award for tax efficacy‟ (MR75).  
Somewhat contradictorily, costs are a potential remedy in mediation but rarely in 
tribunal awards. So as to discourage the use of lawyers, costs are awarded in limited 
circumstances, usually where a party has acted 'vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or 
otherwise unreasonably, or the bringing or conducting of the proceedings by a party has been 
misconceived'.53 In 2008-9 there were only three hundred and sixty seven costs awards in 
employment tribunal cases nationally, one hundred and two to claimants and two hundred and 
sixty five to respondents. The maximum award was £25,000, the median £1,100 and the 
average £2,470.54 Although Legal Help55 is available for preparation and advice up to the date 
of hearing, there is no public funding for representation in cases at first instance.56 As cases 
have become longer, respondents have to consider the cost and stress for witnesses, including 
senior managers, being tied up in hearings. All claims have a potential 'nuisance value' and 
many of the mediation reports contain references to respondents‟ offers being based on 
„economic considerations‟. 
Claimants must also be sensitive to the cost of hearing because, if they choose to be 
represented, they must usually bear the costs themselves. Although the majority of claimants 
were represented by solicitors or barristers, the expense of representation was rarely covered 
by insurance. Some respondents apparently factored claimants‟ risk aversion into their case 
strategy, one respondent complaining that they had not been warned that a claimant had 
solicitor and counsel paid under a household policy. While employment tribunals rarely order 
payment of costs, mediation has no restriction on heads of agreement, allowing parties to 
agree that costs be paid by one to the other. In one case, for example, costs of £10,000 were 
agreed, one sixth of the total settlement (MR75). In only a few cases did this occur, however, 
most parties apparently deciding to absorb their legal costs. 
 
c) The financial dimension  
 
In ordinary cases the Employment Tribunal is empowered to make basic awards. These are 
currently under £11,400,57 calculated according to age and service.58 Compensatory awards 
cover actual and proven financial losses suffered because of the dismissal, usually net loss of 
earnings, future loss of earnings and pension and a small amount of around £250 for loss of 
statutory rights. This compensatory award also has an overall limit, currently £66,200. The 
limits in sex and race discrimination cases were abolished in 1993 and 1994 respectively and, 
theoretically, there is no limit on tribunals' discretion regarding the size of the award as there 
is with 'ordinary' unfair dismissals. This tends to be significant in relation to maximum 
awards but less so in the median or average awards in some jurisdictions.59 For example, the 
largest award for unfair dismissal in 2008-9 was £84,005 whereas the maximum for race 
discrimination was £1,353,432 and for sex discrimination £113,106. The median award for 
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unfair dismissal in the same period was £4,269 compared with a median award for race 
discrimination of £5,172 and a median award for sex discrimination of £7,000. The average 
award for unfair dismissal in this period was £7,959, compared with £32,115 for race 
discrimination and £11,025 for sex discrimination.60 Most awards are not, therefore, as large 
as might be expected with the removal of limits. The new offences of unlawful discrimination 
on grounds of religious belief or sexual orientation follow similar patterns.  
Claimants in discrimination cases, as in all employment tribunal cases, are obliged to 
mitigate loss by seeking alternative employment. The period for which loss of earnings is 
awarded is a question of fact in each case.61 Awards tend to be lower where employment 
continues and/or there is little financial loss. Unlike other claims, discrimination awards 
include compensation for injury to feelings to compensate victims of unlawful treatment. 
Depending on the nature of the offence, and the manner in which it was handled, aggravated 
damages can be awarded. Awards for injury to feelings, as distinct from compensation for 
psychiatric or similar personal injury, were originally set within brackets by the Court of 
Appeal. In the period covered by the research these comprised a lower band of between £500 
and £5,000, appropriate in less serious cases, moving to between £5,000 and £15,000 for 
more serious cases and between £15,000 and £25,000 for the most serious cases.62 
Financial issues were a factor in most of the claims, even where the claimant 
remained in employment, and usually the major stumbling block where agreement was not 
reached. Valuing discrimination cases accurately is potentially more problematic than other 
employment cases because of the absence of limits on compensation. This may also raise 
claimants‟ expectations. In fact, most of the settlements achieved were not so large as to 
exceed the limits on compensation in ordinary employment claims. Of the twenty six cases 
where the settlement figure was stated in the Judicial Mediator‟s report, nine were settled for 
under £10,000, nine under £20,000, three under £30,000, two under £40,000 and two under 
£60,000. There was only one case settled for more than the limit for compensatory awards in 
non-discrimination cases; a payment of over £500,000 dictated by an exceptionally high 
salary. Nor, contrary to other research,63 did the distance between the parties' opening offers 
necessarily affect the ability to reach settlement. For example, bargaining in relation to the 
settlement of £500,000 opened with the claimant seeking £1.75 million.  
These data reflects the fact that mediated damages are likely to be less than would be 
awarded by courts.64 Disclosure of the claimant's schedule of loss was usually the starting 
point of the mediation. There is no way of knowing how realistic these schedules were, since 
they depend on assumptions about the period of future unemployment and mitigation of loss. 
Claimants tended to reduce the sums claimed in their schedule of loss substantially to achieve 
agreement, with settlements tipped more towards respondents‟ valuations than claimants‟. In 
only six of the twenty four cases did the claimant settle for more than half of their opening bid, 
and in these cases final agreement was reached at nearer half of the full sum claimed. In a 
fairly typical case, for example, the claimant‟s schedule of loss totalled around £78,000 and 
the respondent initially offered £5,000, the eventual settlement being £25,000.    
In situations where money is the primary element to be negotiated, the negotiation 
process is usually positional, that is, an exchange of (probably inflated) proposals for 
settlement met by (probably deflated) counter proposals. If settlement is possible, the 
proposals move towards a 'contract zone' of overlapping expectations. The familiarity of 
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lawyers with this style of bargaining may be one reason why legal representation increases 
rates of compensation.65 In those mediations recording the settlement figure,66 twenty four 
recorded the pattern of proposal and counter proposals, a rare opportunity to examine this 
obscure process. There was no fixed pattern, but it usually began with the claimant putting 
forward their schedule of loss. Treating this as the initial proposal, and each offer as 'a round', 
settlement was reached in three rounds in four cases, in four rounds in five cases, in five 
rounds in four cases, in six rounds in one case, in seven rounds in four cases, in eight rounds 
in five cases and in ten rounds in two cases.  
Sometimes, there was little indication that the figures were justified rationally. In one 
case of four rounds, for example, the respondent offered £9,500, the claimant then asked the 
respondent for their final offer, the respondent offered £14,000 and the claimant accepted 
(MR76). In other cases, however, the exchange of proposals was interrupted by quite lengthy 
discussions of the merits.  In one such case the claimant asked for £55,000 and the respondent 
offered £15,000. Lengthy justifications of the parties‟ respective positions led to three further 
rounds before settlement at £30,000 (MR68). It is not clear whether rational argument or 
resistance wins the day. In one case of a high number of exchanges the mediator described 
„shuttling‟ of the experienced lawyer negotiators, commenting that that they were anxious to 
show they „had to be seen to go through enough rounds before reaching an accommodation‟ 
(MR63). In the cases where there were more rounds, the final rounds were often „fine tuning‟ 
involving relatively small sums.   
The financial award was usually the stumbling block where agreement was not 
reached. In only one case did the demand for a payment appear to be purely symbolic, with 
the claimant accepting £250 paid to a charity in settlement of the financial part of the claim. 
In twenty two of the cases where mediation clearly failed it was because the gap between the 
parties‟ financial valuations of the claim could not be brought closer together. One of the 
most notable discrepancies was between a final demand by a claimant of £500,000 and an 
offer of £30,000. Some of the differences in final figures were not large, given the 
inconvenience and cost of a hearing. In at least two cases, for example, bargaining ended 
within £3,000 of agreement, although both cases may have concluded post mediation. 
 
The players 
 
a) The parties 
 
One of the primary justifications of mediation is the satisfaction of the parties, which, 
although the research evidence is not conclusive, is often high.67 In the questionnaire survey 
carried out as part of the pilot, employers experiencing mediation reported higher levels of 
satisfaction with the mediation process (67% either satisfied or very satisfied) than their 
unmediated counterparts (46%) and were more likely than claimants to say that they would 
use the process again. A pronounced differential also exists between satisfaction with 
mediation outcomes amongst mediated employers against their unmediated counterparts (57%, 
compared to 40%). The in-depth interviews reflect this discrepancy and are helpful in 
explaining why it might occur. Three of the four respondents had a positive experience of 
mediation, and would do it again, and the last did not and would be more cautious.   
Among the respondent group, Respondent Participant 1 (RP1) was an in-house lawyer 
who had been involved as representative in three judicial mediations, two of which had been 
successful. One of the cases settled was for £5,000 which saved a three week hearing. The 
mediation falling within the pilot group had also been successful. RP1 was very much in 
favour of mediation as a kind of dress rehearsal for a tribunal, because: 
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(…) sometimes, your clients don‟t always listen to the lawyers, and…being faced with all sorts 
of issues in a setting like that, I think makes them kind of think and recognise their weaknesses 
(…) they can be quite arrogant. 
 
RP2 was an in-house lawyer who also appeared as employer in the mediation. There 
was no settlement on the day because the final positions on compensation were too far apart, 
but the mediation was useful in 'clarifying a framework for a settlement' that occurred later. 
RP3 had handled many employment tribunals but was not legally qualified and attended with 
a solicitor. The mediation was unsuccessful on the day, but helpful in coming to private 
resolution a week later. RP3 thought that mediation offered claimants 'more power' than 
ACAS involvement. On this occasion the mediation event had been beneficial because 'there 
really wasn‟t any communication coming from the person before, any sensible or reasonable 
communication coming from them, but because of that mediation process, I think they had 
sensible people advising them that were able to see what they were up against before they 
went into an employment tribunal'. Regarding the possibility of agreeing to mediation in 
future she would: 
 
(...) probably respond quite positively to it, but I just know from my experience of the claimants 
that there are some people who it would be a waste of time with, because they‟d go in with the 
expectation that they were going to get £500,000 (...) it‟s down to the individuals you‟re dealing 
with. 
 
The relationship with the claimant was one reason for the negative reaction of RP4, 
who had agreed to a meeting requested by the claimant through the mediator without lawyers 
present:  
 
I thought we had had quite a positive discussion, and this was possibly for me, at the time, the 
best part, the opportunity to speak with the claimant and say, „Listen, this is where I‟m coming 
from, this is what we‟re doing, and this is why we‟re doing it‟, and have her say the same thing.  
So I felt quite positive about that, and we agreed – or rather she agreed that, yep, there was, you 
know, some misunderstandings on her part, and as much as she was looking for compensation, 
the compensation she was looking to get was just too much.  So I left that room kind of feeling a 
little bit better that, well, I‟d managed to speak with her directly, managed to say what I needed 
to say, and understood where she was coming from.  I felt quite hopeful that she would go back 
– she said she would speak to her legal person -- and, you know, come back to us quickly.  Well, 
about 20 minutes later, she came back saying that I had said things that I hadn‟t said, and that 
the amount of money that she was looking for actually had gone up.  So I realised at that point 
that it was just a pointless exercise. 
 
Although the mediation broke down, the case was settled later for, as the participant 
recalled, half the amount the claimant asked for. RP4 was disinclined to credit the mediation 
for this, but respondents to the telephone survey reported that mediation often moved them 
closer to a resolution. 
Compared with the high satisfaction ratings of respondents, only 37% of mediated 
claimants reported that they were happy with outcomes, and rates of satisfaction amongst 
mediated and unmediated claimants who were not interested in mediation were broadly 
similar. Mediation was successful for Claimant Participant 1 (CP1) because, she felt, her 
former employer was afraid of the publicity that might be generated if the case became public. 
She had been represented by a solicitor who had advised her that she had less than a 50% 
chance of success in the tribunal. CP2 was represented by a solicitor and a union official. She 
had settled, avoiding a hearing listed for two weeks, and was satisfied with the outcome and 
positive about the benefits of mediation over trial:   
 
I was more concerned about the people that I worked with really than myself – I know it sounds 
a bit stupid, but I was asking a lot of them to be witnesses in the first place, you know what I 
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mean, to get them to stand up in a court situation?  I thought (...) if there‟s any possibility of us 
resolving it prior to going to court, then I was going to take it. 
 
CP3 was the least satisfied of all the participants. She attended the mediation with a 
solicitor, and accepted less than a year's salary, losing half of that in legal fees: 
 
(...) I wasn‟t satisfied.  Afterwards, I felt completely defeated, and I felt like… [it] was kind of 
like another way of…hurrying up the process and getting rid of this as quickly as you can 
without wanting to find the truth (...) It would be different if (…) taking your employers to court 
was something you'd done on a regular basis; you‟d know the system and you‟d learn how to 
work it, but you‟re not expecting to do that at any time, and you‟re not expecting to ever have to 
go back again (…) it happens, for most people, once, and that‟s the experience that they get.  To 
me, after finishing with it and thinking back (...) I feel like I was kind of railroaded into just (…) 
going along with this to make things (…) quick, and get rid of that case and move on (...) They 
offered another amount and I said no, no, and I went back and he came back with a couple of (…) 
you know, a thousand more, and I considered it.  I had a family member with me, and I said, 
„You know what, I can‟t take much more of this because I just feel like I‟m broken, because I‟m 
quibbling over money and this isn‟t about that money!‟  This was about them acknowledging 
that they‟ve got practices that are not fair.  I cannot do this.  I can‟t be arguing with these people 
because it‟s (…) temptation as well.  Like I‟m thinking, let me just take that little bit of money 
and run – I‟ve got two daughters to feed, I‟ve got a home, I want to get away from this whole 
situation.  Do I just grab that money and run and just start afresh, forget them, because I‟m up 
against something bigger than me?  (...) I can‟t do this stress, I can‟t do this twisted stomach, I 
can‟t do this can‟t eat, I can‟t do this heartache, I can‟t do this tensions and headaches and 
muscle spasms – can‟t take this stress anymore and let me get out of here. 
 
CP4 had claims under multiple jurisdictions against a major employer and described his 
compensation as 'potentially very large'. He attended the mediation with two solicitors at a 
cost of £1,000 for the day and, although it had been unsuccessful he was very positive about 
the potential of mediation. He attributed failure, and the delay in settlement generally, to 
respondent‟s tactic of draining his finances and will. The claim had already lasted two years 
with the internal grievance procedure, and was scheduled for a three week hearing. In P8's 
view, the respondent 'went there with the view that they wanted to have a look at us and to 
have a look at how strong I was probably, but also to have a look at my solicitors and see 
what they…you know, what sort of backbone, if you like, they had'. Since mediation the 
respondents had made two offers which had been rejected.  
The theoretical appeal of mediation to employment tribunal claimants, perhaps more 
than to respondents, is that it offers opportunities for participation on the claimants' own 
terms. This is obviously different from a hearing, where the claimant's main contribution is to 
undergo cross-examination, a prospect that terrified CP3: 
 
I was tempted to just give up completely, because I was led to believe that the full hearing was 
going to be a really scary experience because the people I‟ve accused will be able to attend, and 
it will be in a setting where I‟ll have to answer questions and (…) and I just felt like (…) I don‟t 
even want to have to go through that.  I don‟t want to see not one of those people that I worked 
with.  The day I left that – walked out of that place was the last day I‟d ever sit willingly in front 
of those kind of people ever again.  Three years spent with them was enough. 
 
In mediation, a claimant may choose not to participate, an option not available at 
hearing. A particularly appealing feature of mediation, compared with most negotiations 
between lawyers, is the availability of repeat opportunities for claimants to express views, 
opinions and feelings. The importance of being able to express one‟s views to „(...) felt heard, 
respected, given a chance to say what is important‟, 68 is a recurring feature in the literature,69 
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particularly among potentially less powerful groups.70 The opportunity for catharsis may be 
especially pertinent in discrimination cases, but amongst our claimant participants it evoked 
mixed feelings. CP2 was reluctant to see her 'tormentors' but reflected that the experience was 
positive: 
 
(...) it was one of those directors that I had to meet with, and he was responsible for me actually 
going home on the evening of my last day, as it were, and thinking to myself I can‟t – I couldn‟t 
even drive the car after what he‟d done (...) I had to sit in the car for about three hours (...) and 
then I had to sit opposite him (...) I was still terrified to go into the room, you know what I mean 
(...) I was distressed, you know, at the time, and they said, „Look, if you don‟t want to go in, you 
don‟t have to‟, and I thought, no, I do want to go in, because I‟ve got the support there with me, 
with the solicitor and [the union].  It‟s not like he‟s going to start on me in that situation again, 
and I‟ve got to sort of stand up for myself (...)? 
 
CP4 was, however, surprised to be thrust into a meeting with the respondents: 
 
After we‟d both put our sides separately to the chairman, the chairman then suggested that we 
have a face-to-face meeting.  Now, I didn‟t particularly want to face the person who I put the 
grievance in about (...) a nasty piece of work (...) I had to face [the person] with about two feet 
across a table.  It wasn‟t even a big room.  It was the most minute, little room we were all 
crammed into.  The whole experience was, you know, very, very stressful I found it (...) I 
fronted the person out and (…) I said what I wanted to say (…)  
 
In some cases mediators encouraged claimants to address the respondent on their 
perception of the treatment they had received and why they felt it was discriminatory. This 
seemed to be because the mediator thought the claimant would come across reasonably and 
cogently. This was sometimes beneficial, maybe because it evoked respondents‟ empathy or 
sympathy, or even because the claimant came across as an effective witness. It was not 
uncommon, however, for the mediation report to record that the claimant did not want to meet 
someone from the respondent side. In a few instances this may have been problematic, as in 
the case where the mediator recorded that „a joint meeting would probably have helped 
matters but the claimant‟s position prevented this happening. I did not press her as it would 
have contradicted the ethos of willing participation‟ (MR1).  
Satisfaction is related to expectation of outcome and to process. Many claimants are 
sure that they have been mistreated but are unsure what to expect as a consequence. 
Mediation involves compromise, but some claimants, by settling, do not get the recognition of 
wrongdoing that they crave. Nor do claimants usually achieve the level of compensation that 
would make them feel better, and that they feel would punish the respondent. Like CP3, they 
may well leave the mediation process relieved that they have avoided the trauma of hearing, 
but with thwarted financial aspirations. 
 
b) The Representatives 
 
Although mediation is supposedly „lay friendly‟, lawyers were more prevalent in the mediated 
cases than in tribunal hearings. The 2008-09 statistics show that lawyers represented 
claimants in 85,871 of 151,028 employment tribunal cases, compared with 8,812 being 
represented by Trade Union officers.71 The mediation reports showed that, in the ninety eight 
mediated cases, four claimants were represented by both a solicitor and barrister. In a further 
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forty four cases the claimant was represented by a solicitor alone and in nine cases by a 
barrister alone. Therefore, fifty seven claimants were represented by solicitors, barristers or 
both. In a further eight cases the claimant was represented by a trade union official alone. In 
other, individual cases claimants‟ representatives were described as „legal representative‟, 
„para-legal‟, „CAB worker‟, „consultant‟ or „colleague‟. Only eleven claimants appeared in 
person and in two of those cases consulted a solicitor by telephone during the day. In a further 
ten cases the claimant was represented by a lawyer or trade union official but one or more 
family members also attended. In a further five cases, claimants were represented or 
accompanied by family members only.  
Because lawyers are sometimes hostile to mediation, the literature focuses on the 
importance of lawyers accepting the process 72  and being cooperative. 73  Lawyers‟ 
unfamiliarity is sometimes offered as a reason for low take-up and it has been suggested that 
the absence of lawyers facilitates settlement.74 In this study, mediators were generally either 
complimentary or neutral about the role of representatives in the process. In all but two of the 
twenty two cases where mediation failed the claimant was legally represented, yet the 
mediator often commented on the „common sense‟ of the representatives and in only one case 
attached blame to a claimant‟s solicitor for the failure of the mediation, describing him as 
„obstructive‟ (MR54). In fact the mediator was more likely to blame a claimant‟s „unrealistic 
expectations‟ for breakdown of the mediation process.  
Among the claimant interviewees, three were deeply appreciative of their lawyer‟s 
presence, but somewhat bemused by their role in the process. CP4, for example, who 
reluctantly confronted the 'nasty piece of work' in a joint meeting said, '(...) my solicitors 
weren‟t even present.  They‟d asked to go in there without the solicitors.  So my solicitors, 
who I‟d paid £1,000 for, were sat in another room!' CP3 was most troubled by her solicitor's 
role and performance:   
 
(...) they‟d be throwing it back at me and saying, well, you know, it‟s up to you, and maybe you 
should consider (…) because you could end out losing out completely, and maybe if you think 
about it, you know, financially, because they‟ve stopped paying you now and it‟s gone on for so 
long and di-di-di (…) So then I‟m listening to them and kind of believing and then thinking (…) 
I don‟t know whether I can even trust this person, because if my case is so strong, and I know 
that these things happened, and I know that they‟re wrong, how comes this person doesn‟t see 
that (…) I remember one incident where I felt like he was pushing me to do all the talking, and I 
was thinking, „But you‟re representing me – you should be on the gung-ho, ready!  You‟ve seen 
everything, you‟ve read everything, you‟ve taken multiple statements from me, over and over 
again! (...) maybe that representative that I had wasn‟t the best choice, but it was the only one 
that came up at the time, so (…)‟ 
  
In five cases representation was by family members, and an agreement was concluded 
in four of these. Mediators rarely commented unfavourably on representation by a family 
member and one even said:  
 
The claimant was accompanied by her husband, who was both articulate in explaining the affect 
which the alleged racial discrimination had had on the claimant, and moderate in tone. He made 
an important contribution to the joint sessions (JM33).   
 
In a few instances representation by family members was criticised. One mediator noted that 
it had been unhelpful that the claimant‟s spouse, a solicitor, had represented him because „she 
was not an employment lawyer and too personally involved to give independent advice‟ 
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(MR12). On another, a joint meeting „… degenerated, with the claimant‟s mother calling the 
second respondent a liar and the claimant himself stating that he believed the second 
respondent had acted maliciously‟ (MR13). In general, however, representation appeared to 
be welcomed by mediators, perhaps because it alleviated pressure on the mediator to assist a 
party. In one case a mediator recorded deep unease about advising a vulnerable, 
unrepresented claimant (MR66). 
 
c) The mediator 
 
A small US literature relates to judicial mediation by the sitting judge in a pre-trial conference 
with the parties‟ lawyers rather than the litigants.75 Whereas mediation generally seeks to 
promote party involvement and autonomy, „court-annexation‟ potentially coerces consent,76 
reducing client participation and satisfaction, undermining the durability of agreements77 and 
increasing pressure to settle.78 Use of an evaluative approach is often conflated with court-
annexed mediation, giving rise to perceived ethical problems.79 Use of the facilitative model 
is intended to avoid these associations, requiring that mediators outline the various 
alternatives but not impose their own views on the acceptability or desirability of any 
potential agreement; it is for the parties to decide. Using a judge may change the nature of the 
exercise because of the authority brought to bear,80 but the facilitative role does not require 
subject expertise. 
According to the mediation reports, the mediators were rarely involved in offering 
advice or opinions, although there were occasions where they felt it might be beneficial. In 
one case a mediator noted that: 
 
The unrepresented claimant exerted significant pressure on me to advise him whether the proposal was 
acceptable. I explained why I could not do so. In the event the claimant, after an initial about-turn, accepted 
a proposal which was in line with any likely award for a single act of victimisation (...) (JM 22). 
 
In another case, where the claimant was accompanied by family members only, the 
mediator felt that the absence of advice prevented the claimant accepting a reasonable offer. 
In nine cases, however, an intervention beyond pure facilitation was recorded in the mediation 
reports. These included advising a vulnerable claimant, advising a claimant on legal issues, 
advising on liability, proposing a way of viewing a settlement package and discussing the 
merits in an open session between the parties. In one case a mediator commented that: 
 
(…) I was asked to give my „view‟ on quantum by the respondent‟s representative. I did so but pointed out 
that much depended on imponderables such as „how well‟ the respondent won, if she did, bearing in mind 
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complaints of harassment which might have inflated a hurt feelings award. I thought this to be a reasonable 
request (…) (MR36). 
  
The mediators usually did not acknowledge these actions as a departure from their role, 
but other mediator reports noted having resisted pressure to do the same thing. Although, for 
the most part and on their own accounts, the mediators remained within their facilitative mode, 
the participants did not always see them as benign. One mediator reported that a participant 
had experienced a 'commercial haggle under judicial pressure' (JMR89).  
The in-depth interviews suggest that different levels of intervention were used by 
judicial mediators in the pilot. RP1, who had experienced three judicial mediations, described 
the first mediator as „very interventionist‟, the second as „semi‟ and the third as „remote‟. 
Asked which he preferred he said that, the first mediator had forged a really good settlement 
but „it all fell apart the next day, whereas the agreement with the remote mediator had held. 
RP3 said of the mediator:  
 
Excellent – very communicative (...) had authority, but very human (...) kept people involved 
throughout (...) very calm (...) able to take control, I didn‟t feel there was any particular bias 
either way (...) more active than I imagined (...) very good at (…) summarising and questioning, 
but in a very non-threatening, non-judgemental way, to get clarification. 
 
The only respondent participant dissatisfied with the mediator was RP4: 
 
(…) It was all about, „Well, how much are you going to pay her for this to go away?‟ and that‟s 
not what I was expected the mediation to be.  I was expecting it to be, „Listen, your case is 
strong,‟ or „Your case is weak,‟ you know (…) and for us to be able to discuss the merits of our 
case, and to then talk about, well actually, now that we‟ve established that, you know, there are 
some things we‟ve done right and some things we‟ve done wrong, you know, the figure should 
be x. 
 
Apart from RP4, participant respondents were tolerant of, indeed welcomed, the 
mediator's facilitative role. Among the claimant participants CP2 was the most supportive of 
the mediator, although her account suggests that this was because he applied a little 
persuasion to the respondents to good effect:  
   
Absolutely brilliant, you know, really reassuring (...) he didn‟t make me feel like I was in the 
wrong for being there, you know, as they had made me feel (...) it was discrimination for me 
being pregnant, constructive dismissal, and bullying (...)  and the judge is sitting there saying, 
„Look, you‟re saying one thing, but here we‟ve got the proof from people that actually witnessed 
this behaviour – are you prepared to take it to court and have these people stand up (...) virtually 
make liars out of you (...)‟  
 
The other claimants were less impressed. CP1 was mystified by the role of the mediator, 
who had explained at the initial briefing that he did not know the „ins and outs‟ of the case: 
 
(…) he would come back and say something like (…) „I‟m not quite sure what they meant by 
that,‟ or you know, „They would only say xyz‟.  I know that‟s not his fault, but I thought that he 
would have some power to get them to maybe – for example, if he didn‟t understand, then ask 
them to explain, so that he could then explain it to my team properly. 
 
CP4 observed: 
 
(...) We then went in front of the chairman (…) expecting [to] put our cards on the table and say, 
look, this is what we‟re looking for and this is the reason we think we should get it, and these are 
the strengths and weaknesses of our case.  We expected that the chairman would sort of direct 
and say, „Well yes, I can understand that, but you might have to concede that‟, you know, and 
the [respondent] are saying this.  You know, and obviously the [respondent] put their side across 
as well, but it didn‟t work like that (...) I think what he was (…) missing, or not missing but (…) 
I mean, I‟m from a business background, I‟m a manager of [organisation], I‟m used to 
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negotiating and I know negotiating – I‟ve spent my life negotiating – and as I say, my solicitors, 
that‟s what solicitors do.  We sort of half-expected that, you know, he would have negotiation 
skills.  I‟m not saying he didn‟t have them, but they certainly weren‟t brought to bear (...) It was 
more or less sort of left to us (...)  
 
All of the participants acknowledged the even-handedness of the mediators, but a 
comment from RP2 highlighted how jealously it must be preserved. While very satisfied with 
the process and the mediator's role in general, RP2 commented: 
 
(…) the only thing I would say is at the end, the very end (...) I noticed that at that point the 
other side stayed with the chairman, so I don‟t know whether the other side had any benefit 
from… you know, obviously the benefit to speaking to an experienced chairman, who has 
probably sat on many similar types of cases (...) 
 
An independent survey of members of the Employment Lawyers Association who had 
appeared in pilot mediations strongly endorsed the scheme,81 with over sixty per cent of one 
hundred and twenty three respondents agreeing that the mediators had performed well and 
that having a judge as a mediator was an advantage. Individual remarks showed a more 
nuanced picture, with many suggesting that the mediator was less „interventionist‟ than they 
would have liked. Some argued that specialist (non-judicial) mediators might be less 
constrained in brokering settlements. 
 
Evaluating mediation in employment tribunals 
 
Settlement rates are a simplistic measure of the success of judicial mediation.82 Settlement 
rates were relatively high in a sample drawn from a potentially difficult category of claim, 
given that a few cases were not ready for mediation and some probably settled later. However, 
given the similarity in process with ACAS conciliation83 and the similar settlement rate in 
unmediated cases, what value does facilitative mediation offer? A mediator can take more 
initiative than a conciliator84 and judicial mediation is usually concluded in a single day, 
while (ACAS) conciliation is often a more protracted process. A more intense process, like 
mediation, may also be more conducive to settlement. As one judicial mediator noted of one 
of his cases: 
 
There was no guarantee that the parties could be brought together and their starting positions 
were many thousands apart. I strongly suspect that, at least in part, agreement was fostered by 
being in the same building and having immediate feedback on their proposals, which prevented 
attitudes hardening and over-attachment to any particular sum (MR27). 
 
In another case the mediator noted that the settlement was achieved because the parties 
began talking directly to each other and the claimant‟s solicitor „did not attempt to do all the 
talking‟. As the mediator noted, „(…) there is no way that dialogue could have taken place 
without the mediation‟ (MR29). 
The real problem with the quantitative data is that mediation appears to have produced 
the same number of settlements as negotiation. A question is whether the facilitative model 
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may be a factor. In nine cases mediators offered evaluation in order to break deadlock, but in 
many others assumed that the facilitative role precluded this. In seeking to minimise the risk 
of judicial duress, the mediators, given their knowledge and experience, could have 
contributed more to the process. It is possible that the novelty of the scheme may be a factor. 
Mediators and mediation codes often have a rhetorical commitment to a purely facilitative 
model of mediation, while experienced mediators actually use evaluative techniques as 
circumstances demand.85      
The reluctance to desert the facilitative role may have confused some claimants who, 
despite being favourably disposed to mediation, were sometimes perplexed by the 
'remoteness' of the mediator. Some claimants crave a neutral but authoritative intervention 
that was not part of the mediator‟s assigned role. CP3, for example, said: 
 
(…) it really didn‟t make any difference, because the chairperson had to be very (…) could not 
say anything against either party.  He was just mediating, on the fence, and it (…) [sighs] – I 
can‟t explain it!  It was just very frustrating! (...) after I got the whole – got rid of the situation, it 
didn‟t make me feel better about not going ahead and fighting.  I feel like (…) I shouldn‟t have 
given up, I should have continued, but I felt a lot of pressure and there was nothing – there was 
no help – the mediation didn‟t ease that feeling.  It didn‟t give me any more clarity or any more 
confidence.  I don‟t know who it was there to benefit – it didn‟t feel like it was there to benefit 
me. 
 
It may be that the format of the mediation and remit of the mediators need adjustment to 
clarify the circumstances permitting evaluative intervention.  
An alternative to making evaluative intervention a more explicit part of judicial 
mediation is to use Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) as part of the suite of available dispute 
resolution techniques. Thus, ENE could be offered to those who want to quantify their claims 
and mediation to those who wish to settle them, both taken up at different stages in the 
litigation process.86 This, however, assumes that such early diagnoses are accurate and that 
ENE does not create additional barriers to settlement by setting expectations in stone.  
It is clear that some parties felt „empowered' by mediation. The degree of success in 
encouraging them to feel heard and respected is difficult to quantify. In a mediation in which 
„facilitation‟ is narrowly construed, one of the few things the mediator can do to affect the 
process and move it along is to thrust the parties together. As we heard from reluctant 
claimants, this is not always welcome. For parties to exercise the control that is theirs in 
theory, the mediator must support their role in the process. CP3, for example, said: 
 
(...) I was trying to understand how this legal process works - legal arguments, cross firing, the 
language, what it really means (…)  To me, from where I was, it looked like a game, and I was 
thinking this is my life here!  People are just playing a game, and it‟s who dares wins – whoever 
pushes it the furthest will have the outcome and I just (…)  The judicial service, that mediation 
thing, didn‟t (…) it didn‟t eliminate that. 
 
A purely facilitative role may inhibit some mediators in nurturing participation, leaving 
respondents feeling better served by the process than claimants.   
Mediation may also have a beneficial impact on the litigation culture, with claimants 
being better prepared for court, more appreciative of the other party‟s perspective or willing 
to be more proactive in settlement processes. RP1, for example, said: 
 
I think this mediation process has taught me a few lessons.  I‟ve got a tribunal case at the 
moment, and even before – we‟ve just recently lodged an ET3, our grounds of resistance, and 
it‟s an existing employee, so even before any directions have been given by the tribunal, I‟ve 
organised a mediation, to have a meeting in the presence of an ACAS officer, this week.  So I 
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just called up the ACAS officer and I said, „Look, you know, there‟s a case at the tribunal, but 
we want to resolve it, and if you could intervene (…)‟ and he said he didn‟t normally but (…) if 
it helps the parties, he would.  So, you know, it‟s something that I kind of like thought, well, 
why not, you know, do that before we even start preparing. 
 
The telephone survey established that, as a result of being involved in an employment 
tribunal case, thirty per cent of employers had reviewed policies on equal opportunities, and 
forty per cent had reviewed practices. The extent to which this occurs as between litigated or 
mediated cases is unknown, but there is some evidence from the mediation reports that 
mediation stimulates more productive negotiation than litigation would. Certainly, in a 
handful of cases, where employers acknowledged and were genuinely regretful about 
discrimination, claimants were positively affected by this, establishing a firmer foundation for 
a return to work. Finally, although many cases were resolved on a narrow range of issues, 
compensation and costs for example, a significant number raised broader interests. This 
arguably justifies an approach to dispute resolution that identifies and evaluates these broader 
issues.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Mediation appears to offer a chance to resolve issues that might otherwise be intractable in 
discrimination cases, such as re-establishing continuing relationships between the parties. 
Some problems in bringing „informal justice‟ to employment disputes, including intrinsic 
emotional and economic imbalance, 87 were not negated by judicial participation. Employers 
were more satisfied than claimants with the process. This may be because facilitative 
mediation is a lightly regulated negotiation which favours parties familiar with the processes. 
Claimants typically settled for sums significantly less than those set out in their schedule of 
loss. They may be less sure than respondents what to expect, uncertain about making 
compromises necessary to reach settlement and more prone to regret the outcome. Some were 
perplexed by the process, expecting more guidance, and these cases called for a more 
pragmatic response from the judicial mediator.  
If for reasons of economy or expediency only mediation or ENE were offered, 
mediation may be better adapted to exploiting opportunities, assessing value, exploring 
possibilities (including those for future relationships) and achieving settlements. In that case, 
the brief for facilitative mediation may need adjustment to address the issues identified in this 
research. Evaluation is a feature of most mediation, is arguably not as inimical to the 
facilitative model as some of the literature suggests and should not be excluded from judicial 
mediation on the basis of principle.88 Preventing judicial mediators from evaluation in any 
circumstances limits opportunities for satisfactory resolution. The challenge is to ensure that, 
if permitted, evaluation does not impinge on the significant aspirations of the facilitative 
model; to understand the parties' interests, explore their options and respect their choices.  
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